Trump Policy in the Middle East: Iran | Current Affairs | CSS/PCS/PMS/IAS

Trump Policy in the Middle East: Iran | Current Affairs | CSS/PCS/PMS/IAS

Trump Policy in the Middle East: Iran | Current Affairs | CSS/PCS/PMS/IAS

Trump Policy in the Middle East: Iran 


While conflicts - usually perpetrated through agents - have erupted and crumbled across the US. years, each country has considered the other country hostile. Tehran has, in general, viewed the United States - the "Great Satan" - in opposition to both its Islamic revolutionary government and the recognition of Iran's legitimate interests in the Persian Gulf. Washington, in turn, sees Iran both as a common threat to stability in the region and, in particular, a supporter of terrorist groups, especially Hezbollah and Hamas.

Over the past two decades, nuclear proliferation has probably been the main driver of US-Iran hostilities. In the administrations of Bill Clinton and, in particular, George W. Bush, there were concerns about Iran's nuclear program and the possibility of the country acquiring nuclear weapons. At the very least, such a program would raise the risk of an Israeli attack on Iran's nuclear facility - a strike that Washington may feel compelled to support. If Iran were indeed to acquire nuclear weapons, others in the region - notably Saudi Arabia - might be trying to do the same, creating a nuclear arms race that could slow down in the Persian Gulf. The nuclear issue came at the heart of U.S. policy on Iran, and rightly so.

Expanding Iran's influence in the Middle East has also been a matter of concern to policy makers in the region and in Washington. Ironically enough, Iran's power gained a major impetus when Iraq's Saddam Hussein overthrew the US in 2003. His regime was under Sunni control - though he weakened greatly after losing there the 1991 Gulf War - has been a pressure against Iran. When that rule ended, Iran saw the disappearance of a major strategic alliance. Since the U.S. invasion, the Iraqi government now under Shia control, though not an Iranian client, has over time developed friendly relations with Tehran.

Since 2011, revolution across the region has created strategic challenges and opportunities for Iran. In Syria, a longtime friendly ally, he militarily intervened to help save Bashar Assad's rule. In Yemen, Iran has supported the Houthi rebels fighting against the Saudi-backed Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi government. In Iraq, Iranian military influence has also increased due to the threat of ISIS; the Iraqi government has relied heavily on the "Popular Mobilization Forces" which are often supported by Iran to fight the group.

We should be careful about adding to the truth the danger, substantial as it is, determined by
extends the influence of Iran. We're not talking about the rebirth of the Sassanid Empire. In Syria, for example, maybe Iran successfully intervened on behalf of the Government of Assad, but has done so at great expense. And the bloody conflict is upon him arguably Iran is worse off strategically than it existed before the outbreak of the civil war, when he could count on a strong Syrian state as a trusted partner. Finally, we should be measured when assessing the military threat posed with Iran. Tehran has succeeded there benefitting from his army in places like Syria and Iraq through relatively moderate direct use and support for long more local and “foreign militia combatants. Iran has a great standing army, but much of it with weapons has disappeared equipment. His military expenses - both in absolute terms and as a percentage of GDP - they are a fraction of those in Saudi Arabia, bought over $ 100 billion worth The US army during the presidency of Barack Obama and is significantly better than Iran in terms of modern weapons. Then, of course, the military strength is tremendous of the United States itself, which is sufficient to crush a straight, conventional Iran attack US partners in the Persian Gulf.


Comment on both Israel and Saudi Arabiathe Obama administration as useless in handling the growing Iranian influence of the Middle East. Much of this criticism— especially among Gulf Arabs - focus on a doubtful, half-hearted Obama approach to supporting the anti-Assad the face and its associated discontent to take decisive action against Russian and Iranian power in Syria, and some
viewers in the United States were responding these objections. The same is true of him the Obama administration's nuclear deal. Whatever the other advantages were, the opponents were worried that the agreement would be free up resources for Tehran to follow more a strong security policy in the region - both directly, by reducing the assets of Iran held in the United States, and indirectly, by increases Iranian exports following sanctions they were built.


While Donald Trump's administration he maintained Obama's policy towards ISIS, e has changed widely in its approach to Iran. This difference is shocking when it comes to it to Iran's nuclear agreement. The JCPOA it was signed in April 2015 by Iran, United States States, Russia, China, France, United States Kingdom, and Germany (known as “P5 + 1 ”). The agreement set big limits on Iran's nuclear program - especially on it enrichment of uranium - for times goes from 10 to 15 years. As a reward, Iran received relief from the US, EU and U.N. sanctions. The Obama Administration they expended a great diplomatic effort in negotiating the JCPOA; he also invested important political capital in fighting back congressional efforts to assassinate the agreement.


It is not conceptually difficult to enumerate key US interests vis-à-vis Iran. These include ensuring Iran does not acquire nuclear weapons, keeping the Hormuz Strait open for transporting hydrocarbons from the Persian Gulf, and stopping Iran - or its agents - from directly threaten our partners in the region. The problem lies in formulating policies that will promote these goals at an appropriate cost. Keeping the Strait of Hormuz open is certainly the least problematic; thanks to the upper hand of the military, the US has been able to stop Iran from closing the strait for longer than a relatively short period of time. But the other goals raise complex issues.


Any US-Iranian rapprochement - a kind view under the Obama administration - is even unsatisfactory under Trump. But it will be difficult to reverse Iran's influence. As stated, we may see additional sanctions on non-nuclear aspects of Iranian behavior, although these are unlikely to significantly alter Tehran's regional calculus; a unilateral US decision to opt out of the toto agreement could cause a crisis with our European allies. The United States can work at the margins to encourage the Iraqi government towards a more inclusive decision-making process that could include Sunni protests. And we can seek ways, again at the margins, to reduce Iraq's dependence on Iran, perhaps through a more generous provision of reconstruction aid. But these are unlike the end of Iran's victory in Baghdad. The best outcome in Yemen is some power-sharing arrangement between the Houthis and a Saudi-backed government, but that could be a bitter obstacle for Saudi Arabia to swallow. Even if a deal in Yemen were struck, Iran's influence with the Houthis is likely to continue, albeit in a less lethal form.


The Trump administration will find rolling back Iran touches heavy lifts and, at times, dangerous. The EU and others in the international community (especially Russia and China) monitor efforts to set aside Iran. For their part, Israel and Saudi Arabia will certainly welcome Trump administrative position. But an idea carte blanche from Washington perhaps agile leaders in Saudi Arabia and Israel engage in ways that do not comply with the U.S. interests; the inescapable urgency within the EPA is an issue to some extent.

Mistrust between Washington and Tehran has shaped US-Iran relations for decades. That trust is definitely at a higher level under Trump than under Obama. This raises the risk of miscalculation on both sides and the increase opportunities when and where an event is taking place, regardless of whether in Syria, the Strait of Hormuz, or between Israel and Hezbollah. It requires goodwill and diplomacy right to avoid such conflicts; both are well known short supply in the Middle East.

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