SCO role in Kashmir || Shanghai Cooperation Organization Role || CSS/PCS/PMS/IAS

SCO role in Kashmir || Shanghai Cooperation Organization Role || CSS/PCS/PMS/IAS

SCO role in Kashmir || Shanghai Cooperation Organization Role || CSS/PCS/PMS/IAS

SCO role in Kashmir:

Eurasia's constantly evolving geopolitical board game faces its most decisive moment to date. If anyone takes western pathology to view the Asian Renaissance as "Cold War 2.0," the new Berlin Wall will be the controlling line (not) of the South China Sea or North Korea. But perhaps the story has a more tragic sense of humor, as the alliance system today resembles Europe's multipolar concert more than the false bipolarity of the Yalta Conference.

The problem with the Cold War analogy strikes at the heart of a historiographical misunderstanding that continues to plague Western policymakers and military strategists. "Bipolarity" meant restricting the Global South, preventing it from choosing a development path independent of American or Soviet options. It is no accident that the 1979 Iranian Revolution chose neither and received condemnation from both sides. It is also no coincidence that China's rise is strategically (and diplomatically) linked to distancing from the Soviet Union, balancing its flirtation with Western institutions against its own history, political structure and economic potential.

The possibility of change is always limited by our yesterday's shadow. And yesterday's shadow forces us all, one way or another, to become demons. Perhaps the world will see (or have already seen) the Chinese become masters of progress. Perhaps the promise of South-South integration, Asia for Asia itself, or a world free from the nature of Western imperialism would be a measure of disappointment. Finding disappointment to Mao Zedong, filtered through the Eurasians, and now being dubbed "Cold War 2.0".

Cocktails through Eurasian institutions:

And now history presents the moment when all these promises will be tested. This moment lies in Kashmir. The delicate situation in Kashmir is one of the biggest full-scale fire threats in crisis nodes across the larger Eurasian continent. But Kashmir is also a great opportunity for China to demonstrate diplomatic leadership through the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the quintessential "Eurasian" institution. Established in 2001, SCO was a flagship Eurasian project long before the formal branding of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) or Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). It emerged from the collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s as a forum for resolving territorial disputes and security problems in Central Asia.

It has since become a loose multilateral institution where Member States can discuss common goals and concerns, from security and combating terrorism to economic development and the promotion of culture. The original member states were all Central Asian republics except Turkmenistan as well as Russia and China. The organization's main success has been its ability to stabilize Russia-China strategic relations over the past two decades, as well as to provide a flexible and collaborative format enabling the convergence of its members' interests in balancing power.

Strategic tension ahead:

Inclusion of Pakistan and India as full members in 2017. Questions of the future of SCO were raised. Most commentators focus on the fact that, along with Iran and Turkey as "observer countries," SCO has become irresistibly the ideal opponent of West-led institutions such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the United Nations. However, it is rarely mentioned how strongly China opposed the admission of India and Pakistan to this organization. China's main interest in SCO is to use this institution as a tool for regional cooperation and coordination, and not as a tool to distinguish Eurasian norms and customs from Western influence. Indeed, China has rejected several proposals directed against the West directly by this institution. Another common pathology is excessive simplification of Russia's fears about its strategic relations with China and the future of the Eurasian project.

The differences between these two nations have always characterized their recent partnership - differences in market liberalization, the role of Russian security capabilities in the region, oil policy and currency. However, Russia's desire to expand its membership of the SCO reveals that it considers this institution as a potential buffer against Western interference, whether in Ukraine, the Gulf region or Afghanistan. And this vision of security is contradictory, at least on a racial level, with Chinese statements about their intentions towards the institution. It also means that geopolitical results in Eurasia are not driven solely by full cooperation (全面 合作) or the growing financial power of the Chinese. Rather, trends in Eurasian integration stem from the constant restoration of a balance of strategic interests and the re-territorialisation of economic activity and expansion. And institutions such as SCO crystallize these trends into specific forms.

Limitations of the SCO:

But despite all the hype, the trend of Kashmir's dilemma looks bleak through the SCO lens. Due to its open and flexible SCO model it is not authorized to conclude solid legally binding contracts, such as other multilateral institutions. And while this is a real force in adapting development strategies between countries, it does little to stop countries from pursuing their own interests that are incompatible with the "Spirit of Shanghai". Although the organization directly addresses areas such as security and border disputes, any binding agreements must be reached by consensus. Thus, while China and Pakistan could use SCO to open a dialogue with the Indians, without formal settlement power, these negotiations would be endless and would only serve formalities. And in harsh geopolitical conditions, India is simply not interested in seeking a multilateral solution to the problem in Kashmir. This means that any restoration of balance of power in the region will occur through less predictable and often more unstable measures - all at the expense of a larger Eurasian integration process.

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